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Abstract—In this paper, we present a new formal method
to analyze cryptographic protocols statically for the property
of secrecy. It consists in inspecting the level of security of
every component in the protocol and making sure that it does
not diminish during its life cycle. If yes, it concludes that the
protocol keeps its secret inputs. We analyze in this paper an
amended version of the Woo-Lam protocol using this new
method.
Keywords- Analysis; Cryptographic protocols; Secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we present the witness-functions as a new
formal method for analyzing protocols and we run an analysis
on an amended version of the Woo-Lam protocol using one of
them. The Witness-Functions have been recently introduced
by Fattahi et al. [1]–[5] to statically analyze cryptographic
protocols for secrecy. A protocol analysis with a witness-
function consists in inspecting every component in the protocol
in order to make sure that its security never drops between
any receiving step and a subsequent sending one. If yes, the
protocol is said to be increasing and we conclude that it keeps
its secret inputs. We use the witness-function to evaluate the
security of every component in the protocol.
This paper is organized as follows:
— First, we give some notations that we will use in this
paper;
— then, in the section II, we give some abstract conditions
on a function to be safe for a protocol analysis and we
state that an increasing protocol keeps its secret inputs
when analyzed using such functions;
— then, in the sections III and IV, we present the witness-
function and we highlight its advantages, particularly its
static bounds. We state the theorem of protocol analysis
with the witness-functions, as well;
— then, in the section V, we run an analysis on an amended
version of the Woo-Lam protocol and we interpret the
results;
— finally, we compare our witness-functions with some
related works and we conclude.
NOTATIONS
Here, we give some notations and conventions that will be
used throughout the paper.
+ We denote by C = 〈M, ξ, |=,K,L⊒, p.q〉 the context
containing the parameters that affect the analysis of a
protocol:
• M: is a set of messages built from the algebraic
signature 〈N ,Σ〉 where N is a set of atomic names
(nonces, keys, principals, etc.) and Σ is a set of
functions (enc:: encryption, dec:: decryption, pair::
concatenation (denoted by "." here), etc.). i.e. M =
T〈N ,Σ〉(X ). We use Γ to denote the set of all
substitution from X → M. We designate by A
all atomic messages (atoms) in M, by A(m) the
set of atomic messages in m and by I the set of
principals including the intruder I . We denote by
k−1 the reverse key of a key k and we consider that
(k−1)−1 = k.
• ξ: is the theory that describes the algebraic prop-
erties of the functions in Σ by equations. e.g.
dec(enc(x, y), y−1) = x.
• |=: is the inference system of the intruder under the
theory. LetM be a set of messages andm a message.
M |= m designates that the intruder is able to infer
m from M using her capacity. We extrapolate this
notation to traces as following: ρ |= m designates
that the intruder can infer m from the messages of
the trace ρ.
• K : is a function from I to M, that assigns to any
principal a set of atomic messages describing her
initial knowledge. We denote by KC(I) the initial
knowledge of the intruder, or simply K(I) where
the context is obvious.
• L⊒ : is the security lattice (L,⊒,⊔,⊓,⊥,⊤) used
to assign security values to messages. A concrete
example of a lattice is (2I ,⊆,∩,∪, I, ∅) that will
be used in this paper.
• p.q : is a partial function that assigns a value of
security (type) to a message inM. LetM be a set of
messages and m a sigle message. We write pMq ⊒
pmq when ∃m′ ∈M.pm′q ⊒ pmq
+ Let p be a protocol, we denote by RG(p) the set of the
generalized roles extracted from p. A generalized role is
an abstraction of the protocol where the emphasis is put
on a specific principal and all the unknown messages
are replaced by variables. More details about the role-
based specification could be found in [6]–[8]. We denote
by MGp the set of messages (closed and with variables)
generated by RG(p), byMp the set of closed messages
generated by substitution in terms in MGp . We denote
by R− (respectively R+) the set of received messages
(respectively sent messages) by a principal in the role R.
Conventionally, we use uppercases for sets or sequences
and lowercases for single elements. For example M
denotes a set of messages, m a message, R a role
composed of sequence of steps, r a step and R.r the
role ending by the step r.
+ A valid trace is a close message obtained by substitution
in the generalized roles. We denote by [[p]] the infinite
set of valid traces of p.
+ We suppose that the intruder has the full-control of the
net as given in the Dolev-Yao model [9]. We assume no
restriction neither on the size of messages nor on the
number of sessions.
II. AN INCREASING PROTOCOL KEEPS ITS SECRET INPUTS
Hereafter, we give two abstract conditions on a function to
be good for verification (safe). Then, we enunciate that an
increasing protocol keeps its secret inputs.
A. Safe Functions
Definition II.1. (Well-built Function) Let F be a function and
C be a context. F is C-well-built iff: ∀M,M1,M2 ⊆M, ∀α ∈
A(M):


F (α, {α}) = ⊥;
F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2);
F (α,M) = ⊤, if α /∈ A(M).
A well-built function F must return the infimum for an
atom α that appears in clear in M to express the fact that
is exposed to everybody in M . It should return for it in the
union of two sets, the minimum of the two values evaluated
in each set apart. It returns the supremum for any atom α that
does appear in M to express the fact that none could deduce
it from M .
Definition II.2. (Invariant-by-Intruder Function) Let F be a
function and C be a context. F is C-invariant-by-intruder iff:
∀M ⊆ M,m ∈ M.M |=C m ⇒ ∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒
F (α,M)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq).
An invariant-by-intruder function F is such that, when it
assigns a security value to an atom α in a set of messages
M the intruder can never deduce, using her knowledge, from
M another message m in which this value decreases (i.e.
F (α,m) 6⊒ F (α,M)), except when α is intentionally destined
to the intruder (i.e. pK(I)q ⊒ pαq).
Definition II.3. (Safe Function) Let F be a function and C
be a context.
F is C-safe iff
{
F is C-well-built
F is C-invariant-by-intruder
A safe function F is well-built and invariant-by-intruder.
Definition II.4. (F -Increasing Protocol) Let F be a function,
C be a context and p be a protocol.
p is F -increasing in C iff:
∀R.r ∈ RG(p), ∀σ ∈ Γ : X →Mp we have:
∀α ∈ A(M).F (α, r+σ) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α,R−σ)
An F -increasing protocol generates permanently traces with
atomic messages having always a security value, evaluated
by F , higher when sending (i.e. in r+σ) than it was on its
reception (i.e. in R−σ).
Theorem II.5. (Security of Increasing Protocols) Let F be
a C-safe Function and p an F -increasing protocol.
p keeps its secret inputs.
The theorem II.5 states that a protocol is secure when
verified by a safe function F on which it is proved increasing.
That is, if the intruder manages to infer a secret α (get it in
clear), then its value returned by F is the infimum because F
is well-built. That could not happen due to the protocol rules
because the protocol is increasing by F unless α has initially
the infimum. In this case, α was not from the beginning a
secret. That could not happen neither by using the capacity of
the intruder because F is invariant-by-intruder. Therefore, the
secret is kept forever.
III. SAFE FUNCTIONS
Now, we define three practical functions that meet the
conditions or safety: FEKMAX , F
EK
N and F
EK
EK . Each function
among them returns for an atom α in a message m:
1) if α is encrypted by a key k, where k is the most
external protective key (shortly the external protective
key denoted by EK) that satisfies: pk−1q ⊒ pαq, any
subset among the principals that know k−1 and the
principals that travel with α under the same protection
by k. At this step:
a) FEKMAX returns the set of all these candidates;
b) FEKN returns the set of principals that travel with α
under the same protection by k;
c) FEKEK returns the set of principals that know k
−1.
2) for two messages linked by an operator other than an
encryption by a protective key (e.g. pair), the union of
two values evaluated in the two messages apart by F .
3) if α does not have a protective key in m, the infimum
to express the fact that it could be discovered by an
intruder from m;
4) if α does not appear in m, the supremum to reflect that
it could not be discovered by anybody from m;
A such function is well-built by construction. It is invariant-
by-intruder too. The main idea of its invariance by intruder
property is that the returned candidates (principals) are se-
lected from a section (a component of m) protected by
k (invariant by intruder). Hence, to alter this section (to
lower the value of security of an atom α), the intruder must
previously have got the atomic key k−1, so her knowledge
should satisfy: pK(I)q ⊒ pk−1q. Since the key k−1 must
satisfy: pk−1q ⊒ pαq, then the knowledge of the intruder
satisfy: pK(I)q ⊒ pαq too (transitivity of "⊒" in the lattice),
which is the definition of an invariant-by-intruder function.
It is very important to mention that we consider the form
m↓ of a message m that removes keys that cancel out (i.e.
dec(enc(m, k), k−1)↓ = m). We suppose in this paper that
we do not have any other special algebraic properties in the
equational theory. This will be the scope of a future work.
Example III.1. Let α be an atom,m be a message and kab be
a key such that: pαq = {A,B, S}; m = {A.{S.α.D}kas}kab ;
pk−1ab q = {A,B};
FEKMAX(α,m) = pk
−1
ab q∪{A,S,D} = {A,B} ∪ {A,S,D} =
{A,B, S,D}.
FNMAX(α,m) = {A,S,D}.
FEKMAX(α,m) = pk
−1
ab q = {A,B}.
In the rest of this paper F refers to any of the functions
FEKMAX , F
EK
N and F
EK
EK .
IV. THE WITNESS-FUNCTIONS
According to the theorem II.5, if a protocol p is proved F -
increasing on its valid traces using a safe function F , then
it is secure. However, the set of valid traces is infinite. In
order to be able to analyze a protocol from within its finite
set of the generalized roles, we should adapt a safe function
to the problem of substitution (variables) and look for an
additional mechanism that allows us to propagate any decision
made on the generalized roles to valid traces. The witness-
functions are this mechanism. But first, let us introduce the
derivative messages. A derivative message is a message of the
generalized roles from which we exclude variables that do not
contribute to the evaluation of security. This is described in
the definition IV.1.
Definition IV.1. (Derivation) We define the derivative mes-
sage as follows:
∂Xα = α
∂Xǫ = ǫ
∂XX = ǫ
∂XY = Y
∂{X}m = ∂Xm
∂[X]m = ∂{Xm\X}m
∂Xf(m) = f(∂Xm), f ∈ Σ
∂S1∪S2m = ∂S1∂S2m
Then, we apply a safe function F to derivative messages.
For an atom in the static neighborhood (i.e. in ∂m), we
evaluate its security with no respect to variables. Else, for any
message substituting a variable, it is evaluated as a constant
block, whatever its content, and with no respect to other
variables, if any. This is described by the definition IV.2.
Definition IV.2. Let m ∈ MGp , X ∈ Xm and mσ be a valid
trace. For all α ∈ A(mσ), σ ∈ Γ, we denote by:
F (α, ∂[α]mσ) =


F (α, ∂m) if α ∈ A(∂m),
F (X, ∂[X]m) if α /∈ A(∂m)
and α = Xσ.
The application in the definition IV.2 could not be used to
analyze protocols. It is harmful. Let us examine its deficiency
in the example IV.3.
Example IV.3. Let m1 and m2 be two messages of MGp
such that m1 = {α.D.X}kab and m2 = {α.Y }kab and
pαq = {A,B}. Let m = {α.D.B}kab be in a valid trace.
FEKMAX(α, ∂[α]m) =
{
{A,B,D}, if m = m1σ1|Xσ1 = B,
{A,B}, if m = m2σ2|Y σ2 = D.B
Therefore, FEKMAX(α, ∂[α]m) is not a function on mσ (i.e. it
returns two possible values for the same preimage).
The witness-function in the definition IV.4 fixes this defi-
ciency: it looks for all the originsm of the substituted message
mσ in the generalized roles, applies the application in the
definition IV.2 and returns the minimum that obviously exists
and is unique in a lattice.
Definition IV.4. (Witness-Function) Let m ∈ MGp , X ∈ Xm
and mσ be a valid trace. Let p be a protocol and F be a
C-safe Function. We define a witness-function Wp,F for all
α ∈ A(mσ), σ ∈ Γ, as follows:
Wp,F (α,mσ) = ⊓
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=mσ
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′)
A witness-function Wp,F is safe when F is. Indeed, it is
easy to verify that it is well-built. It is invariant-by-intruder
as well since the returned values (principal identities) are
those returned by F applied to derivative messages of the
origins of mσ. Derivation does not add new candidates, it just
removes some of them, but returns always candidates from
the same invariant section by the intruder when the message
is substituted.
Since the target of the witness-functions is to analyze
protocols statically and since it still depends on σ (runs), we
will bind it in two static bounds and use them for analysis
instead of the witness-function itself. The lemma IV.5 provides
these bounds.
Proposition IV.5. (Witness-Function Bounds) Let m ∈MGp .
Let F be a C-safe function and Wp,F be a witness-function.
For all σ ∈ Γ we have:
F (α, ∂[α]m) ⊒ Wp,F (α,mσ) ⊒ ∪
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=mσ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′)
For a secret α in a substituted messagemσ, the upper-bound
F (α, ∂[α]m) evaluates its security from one confirmed origin
m in the generalized roles, the witness-functionWp,F (α,mσ)
from the set of the exact origins of mσ (when running).
The message m is obviously one of them. The lower-bound
∪
m′∈M
G
p
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=mσ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′) evaluates it from the set of all the
messages that are unifiable with m. This set naturally includes
the set of definition of the witness-function since unifications
include substitutions. Unifications in the lower-bound trap any
intrusion (odd principal identities). Please notice that both the
upper-bound and the lower-bound are static (independent of
σ).
Theorem IV.6. (Analysis Theorem) Let p be a protocol. Le
F be a safe function. LetWp,F be a witness-function. p keeps
its secrect inputs if:
∀R.r ∈ RG(p), ∀α ∈ A(r+) we have:
⊓
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=r+σ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α, ∂[α]R−)
This theorem states a static criterion for secrecy. It derives
directly from the theorem II.5 and the lemma IV.5. This allows
us to analyze a protocol from within its generalized roles (finite
set) and send any decision made-on to valid traces.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE WOO-LAM PROTOCOL (AMENDED
VERSION) WITH A WITNESS-FUNCTION
Here, we analyze an amended version of the Woo-Lam
protocol with a witness-function and we prove that is correct
for secrecy. This version is denoted by p in Table I.
Table I: Woo-Lam Protocol-Amended version
p = 〈1, A→ B : A〉.
〈2, B → A : Nb〉.
〈3, A→ B : {B.kab}kas〉.
〈4, B → S : {A.Nb.{B.kab}kas}kbs 〉.
〈5, S → B : {Nb.{A.kab}kbs}kbs 〉
The role-based specification of p is RG(p) =
{A1G, A
2
G, B
1
G, B
2
G, B
3
G, S
1
G}, where the generalized
roles A1G, A
2
G of A are as follows:
A1G = 〈i.1, A → I(B) : A〉
A2G = 〈i.1, A → I(B) : A〉.
〈i.2, I(B) → A : X〉.
〈i.3, A → I(B) : {B.kiab}kas〉
The generalized roles B1G, B
2
G, B
3
G of B are as follows:
B1G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : A〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : N ib〉
B2G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : A〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : N ib〉.
〈i.3, I(A) → B : Y 〉.
〈i.4, B → I(S) : {A.N ib .Y }kbs〉
B3G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : A〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : N ib〉.
〈i.3, I(A) → B : Y 〉.
〈i.4, B → I(S) : {A.N ib .Y }kbs〉.
〈i.5, I(S) → B : {N ib.{A.Z}kbs}kbs〉
The generalized role S1G of S is as follows:
S1G = 〈i.4, I(B) → S : {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs〉.
〈i.5, S → I(B) : {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs〉
Let us have a context of verification such that:
pkasq = {A,S}; pkbsq = {B,S}; pkiabq = {A,B, S};
pN ibq = ⊥; ∀A ∈ I, pAq = ⊥.
The principal identities are not analyzed since they are set
public in the context.
Let F = FEKMAX ; Wp,F =Wp,FEKMAX ;
We denote by W ′p,F (α,m) the lower-bound
⊓
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=mσ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′) of the witness-function
Wp,F (α,m).
Let MGp = {A1, X1, {B1.K
i
A2B1
}KA2S1 , A3, N
i
B2
, Y1,
{A4.N iB3 .Y2}KB3S2 , {N
i
B4
.{A5.Z1}KB4S3 }KB4S3 ,
{A6.U1.{B5.V1}KA6S4}KB5S4 , {U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5}KB6S5}
After elimination of duplicates, MGp =
{A1, X1, {B1.KiA2B1}KA2S1 , N
i
B2
, {A4.N iB3 .Y2}KB3S2 ,
{N iB4 .{A5.Z1}KB4S3}KB4S3 ,
{A6.U1.{B5.V1}KA6S4}KB5S4 , {U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5}KB6S5}
The variables are denoted by X1, Y2, Z1, U1, U2, V1 and V2;
The static names are denoted by A1, B1, K
i
A2B1
, KA2S1 ,
N iB2 , A4, N
i
B3
, KB3S2 , N
i
B4
, A5, KB4S3 , A6, B5, KA6S4 ,
KB5S4 , A7 and KB6S5 .
A. Analysis of the Generalized Roles of A
As defined in the generalized role A, an agent A can
participate in some session Si in which she receives an
unkown message X and sends the message {B.kiab}kas . This
is described by the following rule:
Si :
X
{B.kiab}kas
-Analysis of the messages exchanged in Si:
1- For any kiab:
a- When receiving: R−
Si
= X (on receiving, we use the
upper-bound)
F (kiab, ∂[k
i
ab]X) = F (k
i
ab, ǫ) = ⊤ (1.0)
b- When sending: r+
Si
= {B.kiab}kas (on sending, we
use the lower-bound)
∀kiab.{m
′ ∈MGp |∃σ
′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = r+
Si
σ′}
= ∀kiab.{m
′ ∈ MGp |∃σ
′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = {B.kiab}kasσ
′}
= {({B1.KiA2B1}KA2S1 , σ
′
1)} such that: σ
′
1 = {B1 7−→
B,KiA2B1 7−→ k
i
ab,KA2S1 7−→ kas}
W ′p,F (k
i
ab, {B.k
i
ab}kas)
= {Definition of the lower-bound of the witness-function}
F (kiab, ∂[k
i
ab]{B1.K
i
A2B1
}KA2S1σ
′
1)
= {Extracting the static neighborhood}
F (kiab, ∂[k
i
ab]{B.k
i
ab}kasσ
′
1)
= {Definition IV.2}
F (kiab, ∂[k
i
ab]{B.k
i
ab}kas)
= {Derivation in the definition IV.1}
F (kiab, {B.k
i
ab}kas)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{B,A, S}(1.1)
2- Compliance with the theorem IV.6:
From (1.0) and (1.1), we have: W ′p,F (k
i
ab, {B.k
i
ab}kas) =
{A,B, S} ⊒ pkiabq ⊓ F (k
i
ab, ∂[k
i
ab]X) = {A,B, S} (1.2)
From (1.2) we have: the messages exchanged in the session
Si (i.e. kiab) respect the theorem IV.6. (I)
B. Analysis of the generalized roles of B
As defined in the generalized roles of B, an agent B can
participate in two subsequent sessions: Si and Sj such that j >
i. In the former session Si, the agent B receives the identity
A and sends the nonce N ib . In the subsequent session S
j , she
receives an unknown message Y and she sends the message
{A.N ib.Y }kbs . This is described by the following rules:
Si :
A
N ib
Sj :
Y
{A.N ib.Y }kbs
-Analysis of the messages exchanged in Si:
1- For any N ib:
Since N ib is declared public in the context (i.e. pN
i
bq = ⊥),
then we have directly:
W ′p,F (N
i
b , N
i
b) ⊒ pN
i
bq ⊓ F (N
i
b, ∂[N
i
b]A) = ⊥ (2.1)
-Analysis of the messages exchanged in Sj :
1- For any N ib:
Since N ib is declared public in the context (i.e. pN
i
bq = ⊥),
then we have directly:
W ′p,F (N
i
b , {A.N
i
b.Y }kbs) ⊒ pN
i
bq ⊓ F (N
i
b, ∂[N
i
b ]Y ) = ⊥
(2.2)
2- For any Y :
Since when receiving, we have F (Y, ∂[Y ]Y ) = F (Y, Y ) = ⊥,
then we have directly:
W ′p,F (Y, {A.N
i
b.Y }kbs) ⊒ pY q ⊓ F (Y, ∂[Y ]Y ) = ⊥ (2.3)
3- Compliance with the theorem IV.6:
From (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) we have: the messages exchanged
in the session Si and Sj respect the theorem IV.6. (II)
C. Analysis of the generalized roles of S
As defined in the generalized role S, an agent S can par-
ticipate in some session Si in which she receives the message
{A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs and sends the message {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs .
This is described by the following rule:
Si :
{A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs
{U.{A.V }kbs}kbs
1- For any U :
b- When receiving: R−
Si
= {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs (on
receiving, we use the upper-bound)
F (U, ∂[U ]{A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs) =
F (U, {A.U.{B}kas}kbs) = {A,B, S} (3.2)
b-When sending: r+
Si
= {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs (on sending,
we use the lower-bound)
∀U.{m′ ∈ MGp |∃σ
′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = r+
Si
σ′}
= ∀U.{m′ ∈MGp |∃σ
′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = {U.{A.V }kbs}kbsσ
′}
= {({{U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5 }KB6S5 , σ
′
1)} such that:
σ′1 = {U2 7−→ U,A7 7−→ A, V2 7−→ V,KB6S5 7−→ kbs}
W ′p,F (U, {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs)
= {Definition of the lower-bound of the witness-function}
F (U, ∂[U ]{U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5}KB6S5σ
′
1)
= {Extracting the static neighborhood}
F (U, ∂[U ]{U.{A.V }kbs}kbsσ
′
1)
= {Definition IV.2}
F (U, ∂[U ]{U.{A.V }kbs}kbs)
= {Derivation in the definition IV.1}
F (U, {U.{A}kbs}kbs)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{A,B, S}(3.2)
2- For any V :
a- When receiving: R−
Si
= {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs (on
receiving, we use the upper-bound)
F (V, ∂[V ]{A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs) =
F (V, {A.{B.V }kas}kbs) =

{A,B, S} if kas is the external protective key
of V in {A.{B.V }kas}kbs
{A,B, S} if kbs is the external protective key
of V in {A.{B.V }kas}kbs
=
{A,B, S} (3.3)
b-When sending: r+
Si
= {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs (on sending,
we use the lower-bound)
∀V.{m′ ∈MGp |∃σ
′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = r+
Si
σ′}
= ∀V.{m′ ∈ MGp |∃σ
′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = {U.{A.V }kbs}kbsσ
′}
= {({{U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5}KB6S5 , σ
′
1),
({N iB4 .{A5.Z1}KB4S3}KB4S3 , σ
′
2)} such that:{
σ′1 = {U2 7−→ U,A7 7−→ A, V2 7−→ V,KB6S5 7−→ kbs}
σ′2 = {U 7−→ N
i
B4
, A5 7−→ A,Z1 7−→ V,KB4S3 7−→ kbs}
W ′p,F (V, {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs)
= {Definition of the lower-bound of the witness-function}
F (V, ∂[V ]{U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5}KB6S5σ
′
1)⊓
F (V, ∂[V ]{N iB4 .{A5.Z1}KB4S3}KB4S3σ
′
2)
= {Extracting the static neighborhood}
F (V, ∂[V ]{U.{A.V }kbs}kbsσ
′
1)⊓
F (V, ∂[V ]{N iB4 .{A.V }kbs}kbsσ
′
2)
= {Definition IV.2}
F (V, ∂[V ]{U.{A.V }kbs}kbs)⊓
F (V, ∂[V ]{N iB4 .{A.V }kbs}kbs)
= {Derivation in the definition IV.1}
F (V, {{A.V }kbs}kbs) ⊓ F (V, {N
i
B4
.{A.V }kbs}kbs)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{A,B, S}(3.4)
3- Compliance with the theorem IV.6:
For any U , from (3.1) and (3.2) we have:
W ′p,F (U, {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs) = {A,B, S} ⊒ pUq ⊓
F (U, ∂[U ]{A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs) = pUq ∪ {A,B, S} (3.5)
For any V , from (3.3) and (3.4) we have:
W ′p,F (V, {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs) = {A,B, S} ⊒ pV q ⊓
F (V, ∂[V ]{A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs) = pV q ∪ {A,B, S} (3.6)
From (3.5) and (3.6) we have: the messages exchanged in the
session Si respect the theorem IV.6 (III)
VI. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
The results of analysis of the amended version of the Woo-
Lam protocol are summarized in Table II. From Table II, we
conclude that this version fully respects the theorem IV.6.
Hence, this protocol keeps its secrect inputs.
Table II: Compliance of the Woo-Lam protocol (amended
version) with the Theorem IV.6
α Role R− r+ The.IV.6
1 ki
ab
A X {B.ki
ab
}kas Ok
2 X A X {B.ki
ab
}kas Ok
3 N i
b
B A N i
b
Ok
4 Y B Y {A.N i
b
.Y }kbs Ok
5 N i
b
B Y {A.N i
b
.Y }kbs Ok
6 U S {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs {A.V }kbs}kbs Ok
7 V S {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs Ok
VII. RELATED WORKS
Our witness-functions are comparable to the rank-functions
of Steve Schneider [10]and the interpretation-functions of
Houmani [11]–[14]. Unlike the rank-functions, the witness-
function are easy to build and easy to use. The rank-functions
require CSP [15], [16] and are difficult to search in a
protocol [17]. They could even not exist [18]. Unlike the
interpretation-functions, the witness-functions do not dictate
that a message must be protected by the direct key. Any further
protective key could define a witness-function. Our functions
do not depend on variables thanks to their static bounds. That
is a major fact. All that makes our witness-function more
flexible and would allow us to prove correctness of a wider
range of protocols.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a new framework to analyze stat-
ically cryptographic protocols for secrecy using the witness-
functions. We successfully tested them on an amended version
of the Woo-Lam protocol. In a future work, we will test
them on protocols with theories [19]–[21] and on compose
protocols [22]–[24]. We believe that our witness-functions will
help to treat these problems.
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